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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Can Defendant/Appellant receive a fair and impartial 
hearing guaranteed under the United States Constitution if 
the Presiding Judge is pre-occuppied with other matters while 
Defendant is presenting testimony? 
2. Can the Defendant/Appellant right to the presumption of 
innocence be denied when the Presiding Judge exhibits a 
prejudice against the Defendant, and allows a citation for an 
alleged offence to become a defacto Bill of Attainer? 
3. Can the Defendant/Appe1Iant receive a fair and impartial 
hearing when the Presiding Judge issues a finding of guilt 
which is contrary to the logical conclusions of tne sworn 
testimony of the Prosecution's sole witness, which is in 
direct conflict with the original citation, solely upon the 
basis of deference to the original citation by virtue cf 
L££Zil]2££_X£i_iU r n e r ? 
4. VJas Defendant/Appellant denied his constitutional right to 
due process of law and equal protection under the law by agents 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Salt 
Lake Department, and the Third Circuit Court, whose actions 
included frustration of Defendant attempts to file and perfect 
an appeal and denial of adequate information to comply with 
proper Court Rules and Procedure solely because of Defendent 
indigency and lack of legal counsel? 
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REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision 
(Not for Publication) on December 8, 1987 which affirmed the 
judgement of the trial court, sua sponte, found that the 
existence of conflicting versions of the facts, without more, 
does not establish that defendant was denied a fair and 
impartial hearing to require reversal, that sufficient evidence 
supports the findings and judgement and that there is no 
evidence in the record of anything inappropriate in the 
conduct of the trial by the court. The conviction was 
affirmed. Remittitur was dated January 20, 1988. 
Defendant received Memorandum Decision on December 15, 
198 7. (See Appendix.) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
A. The date of entry of decision sought to be reviewed 
is the Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision on December 8, 
1987. 
B. Motion for Extention of time period of time to file 
appeal was entered on February 2, 1988, with a hearing on 
schedule for February 8, 1988. 
C. No rule UL (c) Cross-Petition filed. 
D. Authority to confir jurisdiction to hear an Appeal in 
this matter is Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court that 
provides for review of judgement, order, or decree of the Court 
of Appeals, when the Court of Appeals has decided on important 
questions municipal or state law, which should be settled by 
the Supreme Court, 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, Article One, Section Nine; 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment Six; 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment Fourteen; 
Utah Annotated Code, Section 41-6-24 (3) (c) ; 
Revised Ordinances of the City of Salt Lake, Traffic Code, 
Se ction S4 . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Defendant/Appellant was cited by the Salt Lake City 
Police on May 12, 1986, for violation of Section 84, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City corresponding to Section 
41-6-24(3)(c) U.A.C. 
2. Defendant/Appellant appeared before a hearing officer on 
or about May 22, 1986, and pled "Not Guilty". Hearing Officer 
stated that he could only go by what the police officer said, 
and upon continued protests of innocence by the Defendant, 
referred the matter for trial. 
3. Defendant/Appellant appeared for trial On June 20, 1986 in 
Case 86-0031106 TC before Judge Maurice D. Jones in the Fifth 
Judicial Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department. 
Defendant was found guilty of the charge against him. During 
the course of the trial, Judge Maurice D. Jones was occuppied 
with paperwork at the Bench, and his attention was averted 
from the testimony being given in this case. Inasmuch as 
there was only a voice record (transcript) made, the record 
does not accurately reflect the proceedings by indicating the 
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demeanor and deportment of the Bench during the trial. 
4-. Defendant/Appellant filed an Appeal in the Third Circuit 
Court on July 17, 1986 with the Clerk of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit Court. The Clerk of Court (Counter Clerk) initially 
refused to accept appeal but attempted to pursuade Defendant 
to pay fine as the course of least resistance, 
5• The Third Circuit Court notified Defendant of Defects in 
Appellate Procedure on November 13, 1986. Appellant was 
unsucessful in perfecting his Appeal at this point. Defendant 
approached the Clerk of Courts (Counter Clerks) at both the 
Third Circuit. Court and ih° Fifth Judicial Circuit Court for 
information to perfect his appeal, on rules of procedure, and 
was rebuffed. The reasons cited were: (1) inability to give 
legal advice, and (2) Defendant was not an attorney. 
6. Defendant Appeal before the Third Circuit Court was 
dismissed with prejudice on June 24, 1987. 
7. Defendant filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court on 
July 23, 1 98~ . which was remanded to the Court of Appeals on 
September 24, 1987 for further action. 
8. The Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision (Not 
For Publication) on December 8, 1987, before Appellant 
Deadline for filing an Appeals Brief. 
9. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on January 9, 1988 
with the Supreme Court, and a Motion for Extention of Time 
Period for Filing Appeal on February 2, 1988. Respondent 
filed a Motion for Dismissal on January 26, 1988. 
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Defendant was cited by a Salt Lake City Police Officer 
on May 12, 1986 for a right turn violation, and was summoned 
into Court as a "Violator". Case law in Larrabee^v^^Turner 
works a prejudicial attitude of the Court against the Defendant 
that works towards a conviction that is foregone before trial. 
During the course of the trial the Presiding Judge directed his 
attention towards paperwork befdre the bench, and averted his 
attention towards testimony being given, both of the Prosecution 
and the Defense. 
The Police Officer cited Defendant for turning southbound 
on 200 East without stopping. However, at the trial, the 
officer testified twice that he was stopped at 200 South for 
a red light before proceeding southbound after Defendant. The 
trial judge erred in the obvious conclusion of tne Police 
Officer's testimony, that is: if the officer was stopped for a 
red light, then Defendant had proceeded through his turn on a 
green light, because the trial judge was inattentive to the 
testimony being given. 
Defendant attempted to perfect his appeal within lawful 
time limits, but was denied access to information necessary to 
properly file an appeal by agents and clerks of the lower 
Courts, solely because Defendant was indigent (See Addendum), 
and not an attorney, and was without legal counsel. Eecause 
of limited resources and lack of legal training, Appellant was 
denied equal access to the Law and to justice. 
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ARGUMENT 
I, The sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
(See Addendum) provides "in all criminal prosecutions, the 
accusedtshall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial 
jury..." In the matter before the Court, the Defendant/ 
Appellant was tried by the Presiding Judge only. 
Our system of jurisprudence holds that the accused is 
innocent until proven guilty. This pre -supposition is the 
foundation of our liberty and basic to our sense of justice. 
In defining impartiality, one must include the process of 
considering tne weight of the evidence and the process of 
analysing the facts in order to arrive at a reasonable and 
equitable conclusion and finding. 
Case cited by tne Court of Appeals in this matter was 
LaKKabza v. TULKIIZK, 25 Utah 2d 2^8, l&Q P.2d 134, (1971). The 
trial court was entitled to accept and rely upon the police 
officer's testimony; the Defendant was entitled to the presump-
tion of innocence. In order that those proceedings would not 
be reduced to a charade, it was incumbent upon the trial court 
to weigh the evidence and testimony carefully to ensure that 
the Prosecution proved the Defendant to be guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The police officer's testimony during the 
trial did not support the original citation, but rather 
supported the defense contention and claim of innocence. 
In this matter, however, the trial judge did not direct 
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his full and undivided attention to the Defendant's testimony 
of the progression of events on May 17th, 1987, both verbally 
and in diagam. During the entire course of the trial, and 
more especially during the Defendant's testimony, the 
Defendant/Appellant observed the Trial Judge constantly 
pre-occupied with the paperwork before the bench. At no time 
did the Defendant observe the Trial Judge direct his attention 
towards the diagram being used to illustrate the Defendant's 
testimony. 
This behavior hardly fits any definition of impartiality, 
but rather one is forced to draw an inference of prejudice 
toward the Defendant from the indifference and inattention 
exhibited towards the Defendant's testimony. Therefore, the 
behavior of the Trial Judge as heretofore described clearly 
indicates that the Defendant did not receive a fair an impar-
tial trial. 
II. Article One, Section 9 of the United States Consti-
tution (See Addendum) provides that "No Bill of Attainer ... 
shall be passed. This provision is equally binding on the 
several states by virtue of the Privleges and Immunities 
clause of Article Four, Section 2, coupled with the Contract 
clause of Article One, Section 10 . (Gunther, p. 487.) 
Although the usual references to Bills of Attainer is 
directed to acts of the legislative branch, the American 
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concept of justice would be equally binding upon the executive 
or judicial branches of government. 
In the matter now before the Court, the Defendant was 
summoned to the Trial Court not as the accused (and thus in 
keeping with the spirit and language of the Sixth Amendment) 
but as the "Violator". 
Although this wording on the summons by itself may not 
be a p^ima ^OLZLZ indication of a Bill of Attainer, it can 
be thus construed insofar as it prejudices the Defendant's 
standing before the Trial Court. In the pre-trial hearing, 
the Hearing Officer remarked, "The police officer said that 
you're guilty, and I can only go by what the citation says." 
(See Statement of the Case, page 3, Paragraph 2.) 
The Trial Judge exhibited behavior, as heretofore discussed, 
that exhibited a prejudicial tone of indifference and 
inattention. Further, the Prosecution's sole witness offered 
sworn testimony that did not support the charges against the 
Defendant. All of these factors conspire together to show 
that because of the prejudice connoted by the use of the 
term "Violator" on the Trial Court Summons (i.e. the original 
citation issued by the Police Officer), the Trial Court 
pre-supposed the guilt of the Defendant, making the Traffic 
Citation a dz^acto Bill of Attainer, and thus violated the 
Defendant's civil rights. 
This prejudicial attitude is clearly shown by the 
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concluding remarks of the Trial Judge: "It's my belief, sir, 
that his (i.e. the Police Officer's) version is the accurate 
one, simply because that's his job..." (See Trial Transcript 
Page 16, line 23-24.) During the course of the trial, no 
testimony was offered by the prosecution either to support 
the premise that the Police Officer's testimony was superior 
to the testimony of the Defendant, or to challange the 
veracity of the Defendant or impune his powers of observation. 
It could be equally argued, using the logic of the Trial 
Judge, that the Defendant was on the street with the express 
purpose of observing traffic in order to obey the Traffic 
Laws and further to avoid collision with other vehicles, 
because that is the job of a careful and consciencious 
driver (i.e. with no record of previous moving violations in 
the State of Utah.) 
The weight of circumstances in this case manifests a 
finding that a "Violator" citation and summons had such a 
prejudicial effect against the defendant as to equate to a 
Bill of Attainer, and thereby violating the Defendants right 
to a fair and impartial trial. 
III. The lack of impartiality and assent to a dz^acto 
Bill of Attainer by the Trial Court, as heretofore discussed, 
further acts to impell the Trial Court into an error in the 
findings and conclusions of fact. 
Officer Caldwell twice gave sworn testimony (See Trial 
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Transcript, page k> line 21-22, and page 9, line 2-6.) that 
he was stopped at a red semaphore while Southbound on 200 
East in the City of Salt Lake, and observed the Defendant's 
vehicle Westbound on 200 South. The Trial Judge stated that 
the Police Officer's testimony pertaining to the events of 
that day were more believable than the Defendant's version 
of events; however, he failed, by reason of his indifference 
and inattention to the testimony being presented in the trial, 
to draw the proper inferences and conclusions based upon the 
sworn statements of the Defendant's principal and only 
accuser,, That proper conclusion (see the illustration of 
the maps and photographs on pages 3-5 of the Correction and 
Modification of Trial Transcript Record, submitted by the 
Defendant) was: That if the Officer was stopped at a red 
semaphore, then the Defendant would be proceeding against 
a green semaphore, therefore, could not have made the 
alleged improper right turn violation attested on the 
traffic citation issued by the Police Officer. Based upon 
the Officer's sworn testimony, the Trial Judge should have 
directed a "Not Guilty" verdict. 
This obvious error was made by the Trial Judge due 
solely to his inattention to the testimony being presented 
before the Trial Court. That this error was made only gives 
further credence to the contentions that have been previously 
argued. Notwithstanding the Defendant's lack of barrister 
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skills or trial experience, which may have lessened the 
Defendant's effectiveness in helping the Trial Judge to 
detect the contradiction between the Police Officer's 
traffic citation and his sworn testimony, the Trial Court 
should have made this discovery in a fair and impartial 
proceeding inasmuch as the Presiding Judge would have been 
attentive to the testimony* 
IV. The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the United 
States Constitution provides that "No state shall ... 
deprive any person of . .. due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the law." 
In Duncan v*. Loulbian, 391 U.S. U 5 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court held that nThe test for deter-
mining whether a right extended by the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment with respect to Federal criminal proceedings is 
also protected against state action by the 14th Amendment 
has been phrased in a variety of ways in the opinions of 
this Court." (See citation: Gunther, £aiS£<s—and—Mat^r^a]^ 
on Constitutional Law, page 532.) The appeal in Duncan u4. 
Lou>LA4-ana involved a misdemeanor conviction. The Supreme 
Court found that even in a Misdemeanor proceeding Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights to be of such crucial importence 
among those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political insti-
.11 
tutions" and "basic in our system of jurisprudence" as a 
"fundamental right, essential to a fair trial", that the 
Supreme Court reversed the misdemeanor conviction and 
remanded the case back to the state court. 
Another fundamental principle in the fair administration 
of justice is both access and equality in civil and criminal 
cases • 
The Supreme Court held in GnX^^n v6. IILJLTLOJL^ , 351 U.S. 
12 (1956), (See Addendum, Gunther, op. cit. page 810.) that 
"There is no meaningful distinction between a rule whicn 
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial 
court, and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate 
appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to 
pay the costs in advance." Considering that procedural rules 
have been built into our modern legal system in order to 
safeguard both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, it follows 
that an impecunious appellant, who has a legitimate need to 
pursue an appeal in a state court, must have access to the 
rules of procedure, forms of procedure, filing deadlines, 
et cetera. By the logical extention of the Court!s findings 
in G/u^/tn u4* It£sLnO'l&, the state can not deny the appellant 
adequate access to the rules of the Court: the rules of 
procedure, forms of filing, filing deadlines, or any other 
procedural means needed to prosecute his appeal, anymore 
than the state can hinder his appeal for non-payment of fees. 
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The United States Supreme Court has determined that an 
impecunious appellant has a constitutional right to pursue his 
appeal without undue interference from the state because of 
the consequences of his poverty. It necessarily follows that 
an impecunious appellant's inability to secure the services of 
an attorney, due to the reason of appellant's poverty, in order 
to insure proper appellate procedures are followed, is an 
insufficient reason to bar appellant from access to any and all 
information needed to pursue his appeal. 
However, agents and clerks of the lower Courts did 
effectively bar the Appellant from that information. The 
Clerks at both the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court for Salt Lake 
County, Salt Lake Department, and the Third Judical Court, 
refused to provide the Appellant with the rules of procedure 
and all other necessary information in'order to prosecute his 
appeal. (See Statement of the Case, page U, paragraphs 4 & 5. 
for more specific details.,) 
Inasmuch as a knowledge of the proper forms and rules of 
Court procedure, filing deadlines, type and manner of filing 
necessary court papers is essential in any judicial proceeding, 
and particularly in appellate proceedings, the state can not 
deny access to that knowledge without violating the Defendant's 
constitutional right to due process of law, and equal protection 
of the law. 
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In the matter before this Court, Defendant/Appellant 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial was not 
upheld by the trial court; and his constitutional rights to 
due process of law and equal protection under the law were 
not upheld by the lower courts. 
Further, the trial judge erred in his findings on the 
evidence by a faulty reliance upon L&KK&bzz v. Tutinzh. that 
prevented hir from carefully considering the charges in view of 
testimony from tine Police Officer that did not support those 
charges, thereby improperly convicting the Defendant. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant/Appellant prays that this Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court and vacate the 
conviction. Further Defendant prays for an Order against 
the lower courts to establish reasonable and timely access for 
indigent and impecunious appellants to all Rules of Procedure, 
law and statutes, forms of filing, dealines, definitions, and 
manner of filing Appeals, and all other needful and necessary 
information in order to properly file a perfected Appeal from 
final decisions of the lower Courts, or any other manner of 
Appeal allowed under law. 
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SIGNATURE 
Respectfully submitted this day of February 1988. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Defendant/Appellant hereby cerifies that 4' copies of the 
forgoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were served upon the 
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Respondent, Cecilia M. Espenoza, 
451 South 200 East, Room 12*5, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
tnis tn day of February 1988 in Salt Lake City, Utah by 
regular pre-paid first class mail. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
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APPENDIX 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ^-p 
00O00 
Salt Lake City# 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Tiir.othyM Srisa 
Clerk of the Court 
ifceh Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 870417-CA 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Greenwood (On Law and Motion). 
Defendant William Paul Barron, Jr., appeals his citation 
and conviction in a bench trial of failing to stop at a red 
light. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied a 
fair, impartial trial and a presumption of innocence by the 
trial judge, who chose to give more credence to the citing 
police officer's testimony. Defendant claims the officer 
testified falsely. Defendant does not cite any authority 
supporting his contentions. Having reviewed the entire record 
and trial transcript, we conclude that the issues raised by 
defendant are without merit and are so insubstantial as to not 
require further review. We summarily affirm the judgment, sua 
sponte. R. Utah Ct. App. 10(c). 
Section 41-6-24(4), U.C.A. (1987) provides that a vehicle 
must stop on a red light before cautiously entering the 
intersection to make a right turn. Defendant claims that he 
did so. The police officer testified that he observed 
defendant proceed into the intersection on a red light and turn 
right without stopping. Having observed the witnesses and 
their demeanor, the fact-trier was entitled to accept the 
testimony of the officer and reject the contradictory testimony 
of defendant. The existence of conflicting versions of the 
facts, without more, does not establish that defendant was 
denied a fair and impartial hearing to require reversal. Cf. 
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court was entitled to accept and rely upon the 
police officer's testimony, Larrabee v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 248, 
480 P.2d 134 (1971). Sufficient evidence supports the findings 
and judgment. There is no evidence in the record of anything 
inappropriate in the conduct of the trial by the court• The 
trial judge even advised defendant that he need not take the 
stand to testify, which defendant still chose to do. 
These and other contentions raised by appellant, which we 
have also examined, are each wholly without merit. The 
conviction is affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
870417-CA 2 
CERTIFICATION 
CASE TITLE: 
City of Salt Lake, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Court of Appeals 870417-CA 
William Paul Barron, Jr., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PARTIES: 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
/Appellant Pro Se 
2174 South 300 East, #20 
South Salt Lake, UT 84115-2881 
Cecilia Espenoza 
City Prosecutor's Office 
451 South 200 East, #124 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TRIAL JUDGE: 
Hon. Richard H. Moffat 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of December, 1987, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION was mailed to 
each of the above parties. 
—\ / 
Janice Ray ,, 
Case Manager 
TRIAL COURT: 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
#CRA 86-38 
William P. Barron, Jr. per se 
2174 South 300 East #20 
South Salt Lake UT 84115-2881 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
The City of Salt Lake 
451 South 200 East #125 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Respondent 
vs. 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
2174 South 300 East #20 
South Salt Lake UT 84115 
Appellant 
AFFIDAVIT 
OF 
IMPECUNIOSITY 
CASE NO. ^ ^ ^ 7 2 . 
I, William Paul Barron, Jr, the Appellant in this matter, do 
solemnly swear that owing to my poverty, I am unable to bear the 
expenses of the appeal which I am about to take, and that I 
verily believe that I am justly entitled to the relief sought by 
such appeal. 
Attested this Z7*K day of July, 1987, inv the City of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah. 
\ 
William P. Barron, Ji 
Sworn, and subscribed before me, a Notary Public, this g^/ 
day of July, 1987, 
.JLTJA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My c o m m i s s i o n e x p i r e s : f ~ f~? -$g"^f~ (SEAL) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Counsel? j 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. ESPINOZA: 
Q Would you please state your name and occupation for 
the record? 
A Mike Cardwell, police officer for Salt Lake City 
Corporation. 
Q How long have you been employed with Salt Lake City 
Corporation? 
A^ Nineteen years * 
Q Now, Officer, were you employed on the date of May 
12th, 1986? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q What type of a vehicle were you in on that day? 
A I was in a white police car, which is a white i 
Celebrity with a light bar. \ 
Q
 v And do you recall where you were at the approximate j 
j time of 11:18 in the morning? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q Where were you, Officer? 
A I was on 300 East, southbound, stopped for the red 
I light at 200 South. 
Q And Officer, from that location, were you—where were 
you in relationship to the intersection? 
1 A I was the first car in line waiting for the red light j 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 to change. 
2 Q In that location, did you have occasion to see 
3 anything unusual? 
A Yes, ma'am. I did. 
Q What did you see, Officer? 
A As my light turned green to proceed southbound, I 
started through the intersection, I observed a vehicle which 
was eastbound on 200 South come up to the intersection, make a 
right-hand turn without a stop, and proceed southbound on 3 00 
East. 
Q How far back did you see that vehicle, as it was 
proceeding eastbound? 
A Before he reached the intersection? 
Q Yes. 
A Forty feet. 
Q And in that time, did you see any stops? 
A No, ma'am. I did not. 
Q So, you would describe this vehicle making one 
continuous movement; is that correct? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
Q What type of a vehicle was this, Officer Cardwell? 
A I'd have to look at my ticket. I do not recall. 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of that, Counsel? 
Q (By Ms. Espinoza) Is what I've shown you a copy of 
the ticket you wrote on that date and time? 
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1 A Yes, ma'am. It did. 
2 MS. ESPINOZA: Wefd have nothing further. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Barron, do you have any questions 
4 you'd like to ask the Officer? 
5 MR. BARRON: Yes, your Honor. 
6 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. BARRON: 
8 Q Officer Cardwell, you said that you were stopped at 
9 the intersection; is that correct? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q Did you notice any other traffic at that intersection? 
12 A There was a car to my left that was also stopped for 
13 the red light. 
14 Q Were there any pedestrians on the street or in the 
15 crosswalks? 
16 A I did not notice any, no. 
17 Q And you stated that you observed me coming up to the 
18 intersection for a distance of approximately 40 feet; is that 
19 correct? 
20 A I'm—that's just a guess, yes, sir. 
2i Q Okay. And you observed me the whole time, being 
22 stopped at a red light? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q You were not then, I assume, at any point in time 
25 that you observed me in this alleged violation in motion upon 
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1 Third East or South? 
<^)\ A Maybe I better clarify that. My light had just 
3 changed and I was taking my foot from the brake to put on my 
4 accelerator to start through the intersection, when I observed 
5 you make your turn, sir. Now, whether my car was rolling, I 
6 couldn't say, I don't know. 
7 Q Well, Officer, what I'm trying to determine, when 
8 you hit the intersection the light was red? 
9 A Yes, sir. I sat through the red light, I'd been 
10 there about 40 seconds. 
11 Q And you had came down Third East southbound and made 
12 a stop at tnat intersection? 
13 A Yes, sir. 
14 Q And at that point, you say that you observed me; is 
15 that correct? 
16 A Yes, sir. 
17 MR. BARRON: Okay. I'd have no further questions. 
18 THE COURT: Counsel? 
19 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
20 BY MS. ESPINOZA: 
2i Q Officer Cardwell, in your observation of the driver 
22 of this vehicle, were there any other individuals in the vehicle? 
23 A No, ma'am. 
24 Q And in your observation of the driver of the vehicle, 
25 did he ever look to his left prior to making that right-hand turn? 
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1 to my left, and the opposing traffic that I would have been 
2 entering into had a green light. If the officer would have saw 
3 me from the question, I would have remained stopping, either at 
4 the stop line, or at the imaginary line at the point of the 
5 intersection, because that vehicle would have been observed and 
- would have obstructed a safe turn to the right. 
7 The fact that I did not see anything at the stop line 
Q approaching the intersection or immediately prior to making my 
g turn, to me, indicates that with the fact that that line of 
traffic had a green light, that the officer had to have been 
.. coming down from the intersection and would have been beyond my 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
line of sight, in which case, I would have had sufficient time 
to make the turn, and not run in to him, or impair his ability 
to either move to one side or the other, or otherwise not make a 
safe right-hand turn, after having made the required stop under 
the Utah Annotated Code, at the point where I stopped was mandated 
at the red stop light. 
THE COURT: Mr. Barron, the situation here involves 
at this point the reasons people would get to be paying particular 
attention to circumstances. The officer is on the street with 
the express purpose of observing traffic, that was his job that 
he was doing that day. 
It's my belief, sir, that his version is the accurate 
one, simply because that that's his job, and I have no reason not 
to believe that he wasn't there. So, I would find you guilty of 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
420 KEARNS BUILDING 1 6 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101 
Wil l iam P. B a r r o n , J r . P££_S<3 
607 S. Park #18 
Salt Lake City UT 84.102 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs . 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant 
CASE NOi. 
CORRECTION OR 
MODIFICATION OF THE 
RECORD 
COMES NOW the Appellant pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to enter his objection 
to the Trial Court Record of Transcript as previously submitted 
to the Court of Appeals as being deficient. 
Defendant produced in open court as part of his testimony, 
a chart and diagram of the intersection at which the alleged 
offense occurred in order to demonstrate the position of the 
Defendant's vehicle relative to the Police Crusier. Without 
the aforesaid chart and diagram, the testimony of the Police 
Officer may be misleading as to inferences or conclusions that 
are drawn therefrom. Defendant's contention? and allegations 
can only be shown and demonstrated satisfactorily by use of 
these visual aids. 
Page Three of this document indicates the intersection 
-1 -
as it existed on the day in question. Page Four and Five 
contain photographs of the intersection as they existed on or 
about May 17, 1986 - ten (10) days after the alleged incident, 
from an angle of view as illustrated on the preceding chart 
and diagram. 
Defendant/Appellant previously submitted these documents 
to the Fifth Judicial Circuit Court and the Plaintiff as a 
Motion for Correction and Modification of Trial Transcript 
Record. Plaintiff/Respondent did not enter any objections to 
this Motion under Rule 11(h); nor did the Court rule on this 
Motion. Plaintiff and Court were served copies of these 
documents by first class mail on December 11, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of February 1988. 
A copy of this Entry was served by first class mail upon all 
parties on this 8th day of February 1988, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARREN, JRT 
d <h» 
"B^ 
•3. B/«<. 
Soorrt 
INTERSECTION OF 200 SOUTH AND 200 EAST ON 
MAY 17, 1986 
PER TESTIMONY OF SGT. CALDWELL, SL POLICE 
A = Defendant/Appellant's Vehicle 
B = Sgt. Caldwell's Police Crusier 
R = Red Semiphore Light SL = Stop line 
G = Green Semiphore Light 
V = Direction of travel of respective vehicles-
P. , ?2> etc. = Photograph plates following showing angle 
of view. 
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